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Medicaid was originally designed as a welfare program to provide health
care to the poor.1 Despite the initial intentions of Congress, Medicaid has
instead become "a multi-billion-dollar insurance policy" for elderly
2
middle-class Americans who require long-term health care. The Medicaid
crisis has been described as "a battle between elderly people's desire for
long-term care coverage and their concomitant reluctance to pay for it
themselves."3 This battle is waged between the older and younger generations,
commencing when the younger generation observes that their inheritance is

1Jeffrey L. Soltermann, Medicaid and the Middle Class: Should the Government Payfor
Everyone's Long-Term Health Care,1 ELDER L.J. 251, 251 (1993).
2
Id.
3

1d. at 253.
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growing smaller or disappearing altogether due to the immense cost of their
parents' long-term health care.4
The first section of this note examines the scope of the problem with the
Medicaid system. The problem is primarily one of cost overruns. As explained
below, the source of these overruns is twofold. First, the system is structured
in such a way that unscrupulous health care providers can easily defraud both
federal and state governments. In fact, Medicaid fraud is so easy to commit and
so difficult to detect that it eats up over one-tenth of the entire Medicaid budget.
Second, the program was neither designed nor intended to provide coverage
to the middle class. The middle class, however, needs coverage and is able to
qualify for Medicaid through the use of rigorous planning tactics, which force
the government to spend more and more money on Medicaid.
The second section of this note deals with the history and structure of the
Medicaid statute. This history shows numerous failed attempts to rectify the
problems with the program. A recent Congressional enactment provided some
solutions but left loopholes and severe restrictions.
These restrictions are explained in the third section of this note. Section HI
addresses the manner in which Medicaid eligibility is affected by transfers of
assets, such as those occurring when an elderly middle-class person attempts
to qualify for assistance by divesting himself of his life savings. The eligibility
criteria regarding assets held in trust is particularly complicated and is dealt
with at length, including discussion of discretionary versus non-discretionary
and revocable versus irrevocable trusts.
The fourth section describes some solutions which could be implemented to
patch the holes in the current system or to replace it altogether. Possibilities for
reform fall into three categories. First, a system of universal, publicly-funded
health insurance could resolve some of the problems of high costs due to
Medicaid planning. Second, health insurance provided by the private sector
could reduce costs associated with fraud, since the providers would perhaps
be more capable of detecting and preventing fraud. Third, a solution with
problems of its own would be to require personal or family responsibility for
a greater portion of health care costs.

I. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
The range of services required during long-term care is quite broad,
consisting of "diagnostic, preventive, therapeutic, and supportive services
designed to help individuals compensate for severe, chronic physical and
mental disabilities and functional impairments."5 The costs are staggering. One

4

George A. Cooney, Basic Estate Planningfor Long-Term Care, 69 MICH. B.J. 526, 526

(1990).
5

Marshall B. Kapp, Options for Long-Term Care Financing: A Look to the Future, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 719, 722 (1991). Medicaid will cover the cost of many home health care
services, such as "nursing services provided by a home health agency or registered
nurse; medical supplies, equipment, and appliances; and physical therapy, occupational
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol43/iss4/4
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survey revealed that providing out-of-pocket long-term care for a family
member would be "financially devastating" for ninety percent of middle-class
families. 6 Forty percent of middle-class families have already experienced
financial difficulty in paying for health care at home. 7 Families that have not
yet been required to pay for nursing home care for a family member indicated
that providing such services for a three year period would necessitate "major
sacrifices. "8 Many families expressed doubt when asked whether they could
afford even one year of long-term care for a family member.9 Greater than
ninety percent of families surveyed indicated that they definitely could not
afford to pay for three years of long-term care. 10 All too frequently, an elderly
middle-class person who requires long-term care spends his or her last days in
poverty.11 Today there is no legal duty to support one's parents. Centuries ago,
there was such a duty under the English Poor Law:
The father and grandfather, mother and grandmother, and children of
every poor, old, blind, lame and impotent person, or other person not
able to work, being of sufficient ability, shall at their own charges
relieve and maintain every other such person, in that manner, and
according to that rate, as by the justices of that county where such
12
sufficient persons dwell, in their sessions shall be assessed ....
When Medicaid was enacted, however, Congress chose not to burden children
13
with this type of family obligation.
Long-term health care not only imposes severe financial burdens on
middle-class families but on the government as well. Fourteen percent of our
$700 billion gross domestic product is spent on health care.14 Even though this
cost is split between state and federal governments, the amount still exceeds
fifteen percent of the federal budget 15 and is almost always the largest single

therapy, speech pathology, and audiology services provided by a licensed practitioner."
Id. at 730 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(1987)).
6
Joel C. Dobris, Medicaid Asset Planningby the Elderly: A Policy View of Expectations,
Entitlements and Inheritance,24 REAL PROP. PROB.& TR. J. 1, 5 (1989).
7

Id.

8Id.
9

1d.

10Dobris, supra note 6, at S.
11Soltermann, supra note 1, at 270.

12 Dobris, supra note 6, at 7 (quoting English Poor Law Statute 1601, 43 Eliz. ch.42).
1342 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D) (1982).

14Soltermann, supra note 1, at 263 n.64.
15lId.
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expense in state budgets. 16 Medicaid covers a significant portion of long-term
health care expenses. Experts estimate that within fifty years, the Medicaid
program could be paying well over $50 billion each year for nursing home
care. 17

There are two primary reasons for the rapidly escalating costs of Medicaid.
One reason is that rampant fraud on the part of some health care providers
causes the government to pay billions of dollars for health care services that
were never rendered. The other reason is that Medicaid was never intended to
provide benefits to the middle class, which it now does due to so-called
"divestment planning," whereby middle-class citizens deliberately impoverish
themselves in order to become eligible for Medicaid benefits.
A. Excessive Costs Resultingfrom Medicaid Fraud
While Medicaid fraud is prevelant, only the most blatant and careless acts
of fraud get detected. For example, an owner of six home health care agencies
in Tennessee padded bills for his services to Medicaid recipients. 18 By doing
so, he collected $4.4 million from Medicaid (and Medicare) over a four year
period. 19 He was finally caught and convicted of fraud after his machinations
became so blatant that he could no longer escape the notice of insurance
investigators. 20 There are numerous other examples. A Florida man was sent
to prison in early 1994 for "among other things, billing Medicaid for home care
rendered to three people who turned out to be dead." 21 A scheme often used
by some telemarketing agencies is offering free home care in order to get a
patient's Medicaid billing number, then using that number to submit
fraudulent claims for payment.22
A congressional estimate of the cost of Medicaid fraud revealed that as much
as ten percent of the total home health care revenues are paid to fraudulent
Medicaid claims. 23 Since the home health care industry currently generates
over $31 billion a year, the costs due to fraud are well over $3 billion a year.24

16Id.at 264.
17 Kapp, supra note 5, at 724. Another interesting statistic is that ten percent of the
revenue for an average hospital is paid by Medicaid. Donna K. Thiel & Christopher L.
White, What Happens to Medicare and Medicaid Under the Clinton Reform Plan?, 10
HEALTHSPAN, Nov. 1993, at 15.
18
1s FraudPoisoning Home Health Care?, Bus. WK., Mar. 14, 1994, at 70 [hereinafter
Fraud].
19

1d.
20Id.
211d.
22

Fraud, supra note 18, at 72.

23

1d. at 70.

24

Id.
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A lawyer who prosecutes Medicaid fraud in the state of New York said, "Home
health care is the next major frontier for fraud and abuse. We've just scratched
the surface."25 The prevalence of health care providers who commit fraud has
been compared to "a grossly overstocked fish pond, where the merest attempt
easily nets prey. 26 Unfortunately, only the most blatant and careless acts of
fraud get detected. 27 'The only ones we get are the fish that jump into the
boat."28
The reason most fraudulent claims escape detection is that the resources
available for uncovering health care fraud are grossly insufficient. Despite
increasing workloads, the number of inspectors with the Office of the Inspector
General of the Health & Human Services Department has been cut from
approximately 300 to about 250 since 1989.29 This situation, however, may soon
change. Recent legislation calls for all states to create effective fraud control
divisions. 30 Beginning January 1,1995 states are required to establish Medicaid
fraud

units.

31

Fraudulent services not only pose financial dangers, but also physical ones.
Those who bill Medicaid fraudulently often provide no services at all. But
others, wary of the ethics of the patient, provide the requested services, but in
a very poor or imprudent manner. One patient, for example, had a lethal dose
of the wrong drug delivered to her home.32 Another patient had an untrained,
33
unqualified, unlicensed nurse sent to care for him. In fact, the physical harms
caused by Medicaid fraud are perhaps even more dangerous than the financial
ones and may provoke enough "moral indignation" to create public and
34
political support for a reform of the Medicaid program.
Without reform to control fraud, other reforms may be pointless. A 1991
study of Medicaid recipients revealed that the federal government saved $575
million when patients received part of their treatment at home rather than at a
hospital. 3 5 The rampant fraudulent activity, however, could negate the savings
36
that result from home care.

25

Id.

26

PAUL JESILOW ET AL., PRESCRIPTION FOR PRoFIT-How DocroRs DEFRAUD MEDICAID

70 (1993).
27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Fraud,supra note 18, at 73.

30

0mnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,42 U.S.C. § 1396p (Supp. 1993).

31Budget Bill Restricts Eligibilityfor Hospital Indigent Care Subsidies, 4 MEDICARE REP.
(BNA) No. 33, at d8 (Aug. 13,1993). [hereinafter Budget Bill].
32
Fraud,supra note 18, at 73.
33 1d. at 70.
34

Jesilow, supra note 26, at 67.

35

Fraud, supra note 18, at 71.
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B. Excessive Costs Resultingfrom Divestment Planning
Another factor contributing to excessive Medicaid costs is divestment
planning. By carefully utilizing planning techniques, a middle-class elderly
person can divest himself of assets thereby making himself eligible for
Medicaid at about the time when he would have to begin making substantial
payments for long-term health care. 37 The government is then required to pick
up the tab. Surprisingly, this process is perfectly legal. 38
In answer to the criticism that such planning tactics are unethical, one
commentator responded, "[i]f financing nursing home costs is not unlike the
prospect of sending several children to private colleges, then the kind of
planning... is not unlike positioning a family's finances to qualify for financial
aid. Seldom is it alleged that the latter type of planning is in any way
improper."39
The incentive for middle-class citizens to engage in Medicaid planning is
obvious--half of all nursing home residents are poor but were not poor when
they began their stay.40 For this reason, the children of the elderly or aging are
frequently the primary impetus for their parents' decision to divest themselves
of assets in order to gain Medicaid eligibility.41 Nevertheless, Medicaid
planning, despite being legal and arguably ethical, contributes heavily to the
rapidly escalating cost of health care.42 In an effort to control health care costs,
the government (state governments in particular) is attempting to eliminate
abuse of the Medicaid system without damaging the availability of
government-financed long-term care for those truly in need.43
In addition to increasing the cost of Medicaid, divestment planning has other
adverse effects. Divestment planning discourages use of savings accounts and
investments and encourages dishonesty, such as hiding assets and lying about
income. 4 Divestment planning can also have psychological consequences.

36

1d. at 70.

37

Soltermann, supra note 1, at 265-66.

38

1d. at 270.

39

Dobris, supra note 6, at 22; seealsoSoltermann, supranote 1, at 277. ("Bending rules"
to obtain financial benefits from the government apparently does not seem morally
wrong to many people.) While on the subject of ethics, however, it is interesting to note
Solterman's opinion: "[t]o their credit, the lawyers who specialize in this area are not
getting rich by taking advantage of their clients' desperation." Id. at 276.
4
ODobris, supra note 6, at 10. Dobris describes the problem as "acquired" poverty,
noting, "these people became impoverished and eligible for Medicaid when the cost of
care in the nursing home exhausted their personal resources." Id.
41
Soltermann, supra note 1, at 272.
42

Id. at 251.

43

Id. at 252.

44

Dobris, supra note 6, at 23.
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Any law that forces people who need long-term care to impoverish themselves
45
is likely to have a demoralizing effect on many middle-class citizens.
Additionally, children generally do not want to have to put a parent in47a nursing
home, 46 and the elderly often do not want to go to a nursing home.
By all reports, the financial and psychological costs of long-term health care
will continue to increase. Medicaid is currently the primary source of funding
8
for elderly persons who reside in nursing homes.4 Approximately ten million
elderly Americans have some type of long-term health care need, ranging from
49
assistance with daily chores like bathing and eating, to full-time supervision.
For middle-class citizens, these health care needs create a difficult choice of
whether to live in a nursing home, which will likely deplete a lifetime of
savings, or to reside at home, possibly bringing emotional and financial ruin
on the family and friends who care for them.50 Over seven million people
received costly, professional home health care services in 1994.51
In 1988, more than twelve percent of the nation's population, or thirty million
people, were over the age of sixty-five. 52 In less than forty years, this
sixty-five-or-older group is expected to increase to twenty percent of the
population, or sixty-six million people. 53 The percentage of Americans above
the age of eighty-five is increasing even faster.54 This increase in our nation's
elderly population is due to declining mortality rates, resulting from medical
advancements, coupled with declining birth rates. 55
The Medicaid program is immensely expensive to administer.5 6 Overall, the
bureaucracy that distributes Medicaid causes a tremendous waste of

45

1d. These negative side effects of divestmentplanning have caused strong criticisms
to be directed at Medicaid in general. See, e.g., Kapp, supra note 5,at 745 ("society should
not condone such mean-spirited public policy.") See also, Dobris, supra note 6, at 23 ("any
government program that is an enticement to commit fraud is not well conceived.")
46
Dobris, supra note 6, at 7 (quoting R. L. Associates of Princeton, Survey for the
American Association of Retired Personsand the Villens Foundation, Oct. 1987, at 8, which
charcterized the desire to keep parents out of institutions as "a strong emotional need."
47
1d. at 5-6.
48Roger E. McEowen, EstatePlanningfor the Elderly and Disabled: Organizingthe Estate
to Qualifyfor FederalMedical Extended Care Assistance,24 IND. L. REV. 1379, 1380 (1991).
49
Soltermann, supranote 1, at 253.
501d.
51Fraud, supranote 18, at 70.
52
Soltermann, supranote 1, at 264.
53

Id.

4

5 Kapp, supra note 5, at 721. Kapp further states that the over-eighty-five group is
"the fastest growing segment of both the general and the elderly population." Id.
55
Dobris, supra note 6, at 4,5.
56
Id.
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resources.5 7 A means-tested program, such as Medicaid, incurs substancial
administrative expenses: the testing process, the appeals process (should a
person's eligibility be rejected), record-keeping, and in general maintenance of
the bureaucracy itself.
A greater dilemma for the government is that public funding is often used
to replace home health care funding formerly provided by family members. 58
In fact, the majority of long-term home health care (as opposed to nursing home
care) is provided by family members, usually in an informal and unpaid
situation. 59
H. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF MEDICAID

"The key concept about Medicaid is that no one really knows what it means
.... "60Even courts are frequently at a loss to understand the Medicaid statute.

Judicial opinions have described Medicaid as "byzantine"61 and "almost
unintelligible to the uninitiated."62 One commentator listed several other
judicial depictions of Medicaid: "a morass of bureaucratic complexity,"
"Medicaid maze," "an aggravated assault on the English language, resistant to
attempts to understand it," and even "a Serbonian bog from which the agencies
are unable to extricate themselves." 63 This frustrating complexity is made
worse by the scarcity of relevant case law and the numerous amendments of
the statute. 64 In addition, rules vary not only from state to stat, but even from
county to county.65 In some cases, this degree of complexity gives an unfair
advantage to health care providers who have enough resources to invest in
deciphering the law and determining how best to respond. 66
57

1d. at 29.

58

1d.

9

5 Kapp, supra note 5, at 729. Kapp specifically notes that "chiefly wives, daughters,
and daughters-in-law" provide these services in the home. Id.
60Dobris, supra note 6, at 11 (quoting NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENs LAw CENTER,
REPRESENTATING OLDER PERSONS at 23 (1985)).

61Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981).
62

Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 727 n.7 (2nd Cir. 1976).

63

Dobris, supra note 6, at 12. Dobris comments whimsically that "[t]he list of judges
who have figuratively wept in the face of this program's complexity is a decidedly
impressive one." Id. at 11-12. He also notes some potentially positive reasons for the level
of complexity. For example, it creates jobs; it scares applicants away, resulting in lower
costs to the government; and it delays payments, allowing the government to use the
money longer. Id. at 13-14. He suggests that these reasons are mostly illusory. Id. at 14.
64

Soltermann, supra note 1, at 273.

65

d. at 274. Thus, "it is important to know the administrators and their current,
unwritten interpretations." Dobris, supra note 6, at 13.
66
Carolyn Tuohy, The Clinton Reform Plan-Response to the Clinton Proposal: A
ComparativePerspective,19 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 249, 252 (1994).
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The original purpose of the Medicaid program was to provide health care to
those who truly could not afford it themselves. 67 Despite these innocent
intentions, Medicaid has played a major part in causing the current health care
crisis.68 The program grew quickly, exceeded its original purpose as a welfare
system and now dominates the long-term health care market. 69 Medicaid
programs vary from state to state, both in the scope of services provided and
in terms of the individuals covered. 70 All states, however, must follow federal
statutory interpretations and regulations put forth by the Federal Health Care
Financing Administration. 7 1 Each state must also develop reasonable
standards for determining the extent of coverage and the eligibility
assistance.72
Medicaid is a "means-tested" program, meaning that eligibility for Medicaid
depends on meeting various income and resource tests. 73 Basically, an
applicant must satisfy income limits established by the state in order to receive
coverage, unless he or she automatically qualifies for coverage by being eligible
for receipt of other governmental health-related assistance. 74 Excess income
must be spent down-spent on incurred medical expenses-before coverage
will be granted. 75 In most states, an applicant will not be eligible if his
non-exempt resources exceed two thousand dollars. 76

67

Soltermann, supra note 1, at 262.

68

Id.

69

Id.

7

OId. at 255.

71

id. at 254-55.

7242 U.S.C. section 1396a(a)(17)(1988). The extent of variation from one state to
another encompasses many aspects of the Medicaid program:
Individual states have experimented with a variety of reimbursement
methods for nursing home care under their respective Medicaid programs. States' plans vary on whether they provide retrospective or
prospective cost reimbursement and whether they base ceilings on
facility or area characteristics. The states' plans also differ in the height
of the ceiling set, and in the provision of inflation adjustments, efficiency
incentives, patient outcome-related rates, as well as in their treatment of
real property costs.
Kapp, supranote 5, at 725-26.
73
Michael Bagge, The Eye of the Needle: Trust Planning,Medicaid and the Ersatz Poor,
64 N.Y. ST. B.J. 14, 15 (1992).
74

Soltermann, supra note 1, at 255.

75

1d. at 256.

76

Id. at 257. Soltermann notes, however, that "this limit is subject to monthly income
and marital status and is adjusted periodically for inflation." Id.
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A. Structure of the Medicaid Statute
The Medicaid program was established in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social
Security Act. 77 The program provides federal financial assistance to a state if
that state chooses to cover the costs of certain medical treatments for needy
persons. 78 The federal government, in essence, "shares the costs of Medicaid
with the states that elect to participate in the program ... ."79 A state is not
required to participate in the Medicaid program but "must comply with the
requirements of Title XIX" if it does participate. 80
Under the 1965 version of Medicaid, all states participating in the program
were required to provide medical assistance to anyone who received financial
assistance under one of four other programs. 81 The four programs were Old
Age Assistance, 82 Aid to Families with Dependent Children,83 Aid to the
Blind, 84 and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled. 85 These people were
called "categorically needy" individuals, because, due to family circumstances,
86
age, or disability, they were particularly needy of public assistance.
In addition to providing services to the "categorically needy" group, states
have the option of providing care to another group.87 States were permitted,

7742 U.S.C. § 1396a (1988).
78
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34,36 (1981)(citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 301 (1980)).
79
Indiana Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Payne, 592 N.E.2d 714, 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
Though the total cost is shared between state and federal governments, the state
governments actually "bear a substantial part of the cost." Noland v. Shalala, 12 F.3d
258, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Governmental responsibilities are divided so that "state law
establishes income and resource limits, [while] federal law requires that income and
resources be actually available .... Soltermann, supra note 1, at 257 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(17)(B) (1988)).
80Roloff v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 333, 335 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 301 (1980)).
81

Schweiker, 453 U.S. at 37.
01d Age Assistance, 42 U.S.C. § 301 (1970), repealed by Pub. L. 92-603 title I,
§ 303(a), (b), 86 Stat. 1484 (1972) (repealed except with respect to Puerto Rico, Guam and
the Virgin Islands).
83
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970), as amended by 42
U.S.C. § 1381 (1988).
82

84

Aid to the Blind, 42 U.S.C. § 1201 (1970), repealedby Pub. L. 92-603, title III, § 303(a),
(b), 86 Stat. 1484 (1972) (repealed except with respect to Puerto Rico, Guam, and the
Virgin Islands).
85
Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, 42 U.S.C. § 1351 (1970), repealed by
Pub. L. 92-603, title III, § 303(a), (b), 86 Stat. 1484 (1972) (repealed except with respect to
Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands).
86
Schweiker, 453 U.S. at 37.
87
Roloff, 975 F.2d at 335.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol43/iss4/4
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but not required, to provide assistance to the "medically needy," defined as
"persons lacking the ability to pay for medical expenses, but with incomes too
large to qualify for categorical assistance."88 States were "required to adopt
reasonable eligibility standards" for evaluating the financial need of
applicants. 89 The evaluation must be based only on income and resources
which are actually available to the applicant or recipient 90 and not on that
person's financial history or responsibility. 91
Subsequently, in 1972, three of the categorical assistance programs (all except
Aid to Families with Dependent Children) were merged into one new program
known as Supplemental and Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled
[hereinafter SSI].92 One result of the SSI legislation was that a significantly
greater number of people became eligible for public assistance. 93 States,
however, were still required to provide Medicaid coverage for all individuals
who qualified for other public assistance under SSI.94 Due to the increased
number of eligible applicants, Congress feared that many states would conduct
95
a mass exodus from the program as opposed to offering expanded coverage.
Therefore, Congress created the "209(b) option," so named because it appeared
as § 209(b) of the 1972 amendments to Medicaid.9 6 The 209(b) option allows
states to choose between accepting this expanded coverage of all those eligible
for SSI, or, in the alternative, retaining their more restrictive eligibility
requirements which were in place as of January 1, 1972. 97 The 209(b) option
allows states to use eligibility tests that are more restrictive than the
corresponding federal eligibility tests. 98 States are generally described as being
either "SSI states" or "209(b) states." 99
88

Schweiker, 453 U.S. at 37.

89

Indiana Dep't. of Pub. Welfare v. Payne, 592 N.E.2d 714, 720 (Ind. Ct. App, 1992).
9042 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(B) (1988).
9142 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D) (1988).
92

Supplemental and Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1381 (1988).
93
Schweiker, 453 U.S at 36.
94

1d. at 38. This requirement "threatened to swell the Medicaid roles and place a large
financial burden on those states." Morris v. Morrow, 783 F.2d 454, 456 (4th Cir. 1986).
95Schweiker, 453 U.S. at 38.
96
Section 209(b) is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(f), but it is still referred to as
§ 209(b).
97
Schweiker, 453 U.S. at38-39. "Section 209(b) does notprovide an independent basis
for Medicaid eligibility, but is merely an exception that permits States to exclude those
individuals who would not have been eligible for Medicaid in 1972 prior to the passage
of the [SSI] Act." Morris, 783 F.2d at 459.
98
Mowbray v. Kozlowski, 914 F.2d 593, 594 (4th Cir. 1990). 'In 209(b) states, a
person's eligibility or ineligibility for SSI is largely irrelevant to his or her Medicaid
eligibility ... " Noland v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 258, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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Important rules apply to the 209(b) states. One rule is that states exercising
the 209(b) option must provide benefits to the medically needy group, as well
as the categorically needy.100 Another is the requirement that the state allow
an applicant to "spend down" his or her income to become eligible. 101 This
means that an individual whose income is too high to allow him to receive aid
may become eligible once he has paid for enough medical services to place his
income below the limit.102 For instance, if a state has decided that a Medicaid
applicant will only be accepted if his or her income is below $600 per month,
then the applicant with a monthly income of $700 must spend one hundred
dollars on medical care each month before Medicaid will cover the remaining
medical bills. If the applicant incurred medical expenses totaling $1,000 that
month, Medicaid would then pay $900.
The spend down requirements have positive and negative consequences. On
the positive side, an individual will be provided with Medicaid coverage for
medical care once he descends to the income level where he can no longer
afford to pay for medical care himself. Without the spend down provision, this
individual would never be eligible for Medicaid benefits, even when he ran out
of money. On the negative side, the incentive to "spend down" has actually
increased the costs of health care. In percentage of income and in actual dollars,
the average elderly citizen spends more on total health care today than in 1965
when Medicaid was enacted. 103
The spend down requirement is mandatory for 209(b) states, and is optional
for SSI states. 104 In SSI states that do not offer the spend-down option, needy
applicants often suffer from an inability to obtain care due to the depletion of
their personal assets. That is, if the income of an applicant is even one dollar
higher than the limit set by the state, that individual cannot receive Medicaid
benefits regardless of the cost of his care.
B. PreviousAttempts to Correct the Problems
Several times, Congress has tried to amend Medicaid or establish a different,
more effective program. These attempts essentially have been universal
failures. In 1987, Representative Claude Pepper introduced a bill in Congress
which was intended to greatly expand long-term care benefits under the
Medicare program.105 The bill was voted down by a substantial margin. 106 In
99 See, e.g.,

Roloff v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1992).
783 F.2d at 457.
101Roloff, 975 F.2d at 336-38.
1021d.
100 Morris,

103Kapp, supranote 5, at 726.
104Roloff, 975 F.2d at 336.
10SKapp, supranote 5, at 739.
106

Id.
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1988, Senator George Mitchell sponsored a bill which would have provided
coverage for nursing home stays in excess of two years, although the
beneficiary would still be required to pay thirty percent of the cost. 10 7 This bill
never reached the congressional floor.108 Also in 1988, Representative Henry
Waxman introduced legislation similar to Medicaid, but more comprehensive,
which would have provided long-term nursing home or community-based
care to the poor.109 This bill also failed to reach the floor.110 In 1988, Congress
enacted the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act [hereinafter MCCA], in an
attempt to protect the elderly from impoverishment in case of a catastrophic
illness requiring lengthy hospitalization. 111 The MCCA was112repealed the
following year after elderly taxpayers "refused to foot the bill."
One program, however, actually met with some success. The Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation [hereinafter Foundation] allowed individuals who
purchased private long-term care insurance to be eligible for Medicaid once
their insurance benefits were consumed. 113 These individuals remained
Medicaid-eligible even if their resources exceeded the limit set by the state, up
to the dollar amount of the coverage they had purchased. 114 In passing new
legislation, however, Congress chose to restrict this apparently successful
permitted to
program.1 1 5 States which already utilized the Foundation were
116
program.
the
establish
now
may
state
continue, but no new
The most recent attempt to revise the American health care system was the
Clinton health care plan. In excess of 1,300 pages, this proposed system was
possibly even more complex than Medicaid. The proposal was essentially "a
complicated package of compromises."117 One admirable goal of the plan was
to eliminate the "second class status" often associated with Medicaid.11 8 Amore
important goal, a primary purpose of the plan, was to provide universal health
10 7
10 8

Id.
d. at 739, n.147.

9

10 Kapp, supra note 5, at 739-40.
1101d. at 740 n.149.
111
Soltermann, supra note 1, at 253. The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988,
Pub.L. No. 100-360, was contained in various sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.. Id. at
253 n.9.
112Id. at 253, n.9.

113Kapp, supra note 5, at 748.
114d.
115Robert Freedman, Protecting Hard Earned Assets-Payingfor Long-Term Care, in
UNDERSTANDING BAsic ESTATE PLANNING 1994, at 119,123 (PLI Comm. Law & Practice
Course Handbook Serv.s No. D4-5252,1994).

116Id.
ll 7 Thiel & White, supra note 17, at 20.
118Id. at 15.
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insurance through organizations known as "Regional Health Alliances." 119 The
Alliances would oversee relationships among insurance providers to prevent
20
pricing measures which defeat the advantages of healthy competition.1 This
purpose was to be facilitated by combining small employers into larger groups
so as to reduce the costs and risks of insurance and to provide employers with
121

more buying leverage.
The plan also would have offered expanded long-term care benefits,
including revision of the Medicaid spend-down requirements to allow
exclusion of additional assets. 122 Applicants would have been allowed to retain
up to $12,000 in personal assets and a $70 monthly living allowance. 123 Finally,
the proposal would have provided a wider range of services outside of
hospitals to Medicaid recipients who need home care. 12 4 The proposal barely
got off the ground and was ultimately discarded.

119
120

1d.
1d. at 15-16. The Alliances were intended to be the key element in a three-tiered

structure. Dean R. Jerry, The Clinton Administration'sHealth InsuranceProposal,3 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 120, 121 (1994). Prior to its failure to become enacted, the plan was
described in the following way:
A National Health Board oversees the entire system and sets general performance criteria and monitors performances. The health
alliances are the key structural element. These are the purchasing
cooperatives established in each region to monitor and manage
the way in which the private health insurance market operates.
Health plans are the individual health insurance companies
offered to the population in each area through the health alliances.
Health alliances are required to accept all health plans in each
area that meet minimum criteria, unless those health plans offer
prices that exceed 120% of the area-wide average premium, in
which case the alliance is allowed to bargain and refuse to accept
the health plan. That's the basic way health alliances exercise
purchasing power.

Id.
121Jerry, supra note 120, at 125.
122

Thiel & White, supra note 17, at 19.

123

1d. Thiel observes, however, that "the long-term care proposal [fell] short of most
American's hopes." Id.
124 Comprehensive Long-Term Care Benefits Not Anticipated in Clinton Reform Plan, 4
MEDICARE REP. (BNA) No. 34, at d8 (Aug. 20, 1993). As a final comment on previous
attempts at health care reform, there was an attempt bearing similarity to the Clinton
proposal about twenty years ago:
[In 1974, it appeared for a time that a bipartisan coalition might
achieve a comprehensive national health insurance plan built up
on a combination of private carriers and government programs.
In the partisan maneuvering leading up to the 1974 congressional
elections under the cloud of Watergate, however, the moment was
lost.
Tuohy, supra note 66, at 252.
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C. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993

Congress recently enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
[hereinafter OBRA '931.125 The changes under this new statute mainly affect
the rules relating to self-settled trusts, as well as transfers of assets and
corresponding periods of Medicaid ineligibility.126 The changes, which are
described below, will likely have a dramatic impact on divestment planning
techniques. 127 One report indicates that the changes will result in an "estimated
savings to the federal government [of] $25 million in fiscal 1994 and $650
...... ,"128
million over the next five years
III. RESTRICTIONS AND LOOPHOLES IN MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY

In the past few years, a typical question before state courts has been whether
a trust beneficiary is eligible to receive Medicaid benefits. The question is
whether the assets of the trust are considered "available" to the beneficiary for
determining
purposes of determining his or her eligibility.129 Unfortunately,
130
whether the eligibility tests are satisfied is not an easy task.
A. Transfers
When a person transfers assets for less than their fair market value prior to
applying for Medicaid, he or she will be ineligible for Medicaid benefits for a
certain period of time.1 31 The period of ineligibility is equal to the number of
months during which the applicant could have paid for his own care had he
not transferred the asset. In most states, the cost of nursing home care is
approximately $3,000.00 per month.132 Thus, for example, if an applicant
transfers a $30,000.00 asset, he will be ineligible to receive Medicaid benefits

125Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,42 U.S.C. § 1396p (1993).
126Sanford J.Schlesinger &Barbara J.Scheiner, OBRA '93 Makes Sweeping Changes in
Medicaid Rules, 21 EST. PLAN. 74, 74 (1994).
127
Id.
128Budget Bill, supranote 31, at d8.

129Ronald R. Volkmer, Trust Construction Suit and Medicaid Eligibility, 21 EsT. PLAN.

189 (1994). Volkmer discusses a case which "illustrates how disputes over the sole issue
of the eligibility for Medicaid, might, for all practical purposes, be litigated
simultaneously in the courts and in the administrative channels." Id. (citing Young v.
Dep't of Public Welfare, 624 N.E.2d 110 (1993)).
130Soltermann, supranote 1, at 290 n.29.
13142 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(a) (1988).
132Schlesinger &Scheiner, supranote 126, at 76. However, "the average cost of private
nursing home care varies among states and even among areas within states." Id.
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for ten months. Before OBRA'93, the period of ineligibility was limited to thirty
months.133 Now, however, there is no limit on the period of ineligibility. 134
If the uncompensated transfer is made three to five years prior to the
Medicaid application, then the transfer will not be counted for eligibility
purposes.135 This three to five year period prior to Medicaid application is
known as the "look-back period."136 Any transfer of assets for less than fair
market value during the look-back period will result in a period of ineligibility.
Before OBRA '93, the look-back period was only thirty months. 13 7 The new
legislation extended the period to thirty-six months for most transfers, and to
138
sixty months for transfers from a trust.

For example, under OBRA'93, if a Medicaid applicant transfers $150,000 on
January 1, 1995, and subsequently applies for Medicaid on December 1, 1997
(thirty-five months later,) the penalty period would be calculated by dividing
$150,000.00 by $3,000.00 (the average cost of a nursing home stay per month,)
resulting in a fifty-month period of ineligibility from the date of the transfer
(that is, until March 1, 1999.) If this person waited until the thirty-seventh
month (February 1, 1998) to apply for Medicaid, however, then the transfer
made in January 1995 would not be within the thirty-six month look-back
period and would not be relevant in the determination of Medicaid eligibility.
The applicant would be eligible for Medicaid assistance beginning in January,
1998.
If the $150,000.00 transfer were made from a trust, a sixty-month look-back
period would apply. In that case, the applicant would not become eligible for
Medicaid until January 1, 2000, regardless of when he or she applied!
The statute uses a "first day of the month" rule to determine when the period
of ineligibility begins. 139 This rule allows a slight advantage for persons
1331d.; see also Barbara J. Collins, Summary: Recent Changesin FederalMedicalAssistance
Law, in Elder Law Institute 1994, at 123,127(PLI Est. Plan. & Admin. Course Handbook
Services No. D-235,1994).
13442 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(a).
13542 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1). Section 1396p(c)(1)(B)(i) specifically relates to trusts.
136 Schlesinger & Scheiner, supra note 126, at 75.
13 7

1d. See also Collins, supra note 133, at 129.
13842 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B)(i). "Most practitioners ... contend that the language of
the new provision is so confusing that a technical amendment will be necessary prior
to its implementation." Schlesinger & Scheiner, supra note 126, at 74. The confusing
portion of the statute reads as follows:
(B)(i) The look-back date specified in this subparagraph is a date
that is 36 months (or, in the case of payments from a trust or portions
of a trust that are treated as assets disposed of by the individual pursuant to paragraph (3)(A)(iii) [relating to revocable trusts] or (3)(B)(ii)
[relating to irrevocable trusts] of subsection (d), 60 months before the
date specified in clause (ii).

42 U.S.C. § 1396p(C)(1)(B)(i).
13942 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(D).
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making disqualifying transfers at the end of a month in that the ineligibility
period will be considered to have started at the beginning of the month. This
is a small advantage, however, in proportion to the three to five year look-back
period and the potentially unlimited ineligibility period. In the case of multiple
transfers prior to OBRA '93, the periods of ineligibility would run concurrently,
and the transferor could benefit by over-lapping periods. 140 Now, however, the
periods of ineligibility will run consecutively. 14 1 Thus, before OBRA '93, if a
person made a transfer in January that resulted in ten months of ineligibility,
then made another transfer in March (two months later) that resulted in eight
months of ineligibility, the person would have been eligible for Medicaid at the
end of November (eight months after the second transfer) for a total period of
ineligibility of ten months. Under the new law, however, these two transfers
would be aggregated, and the individual would have to endure eighteen
months of ineligibility.
The period of ineligibility can be avoided if an applicant can overcome the
presumption that he transferred assets for the sole purpose of qualifying for
Medicaid. 142 Generally, an applicant will not be penalized for the transfer if he
makes a gift without retaining any interest in the property, provided his intent
was not to become eligible for Medicaid, but to avoid probate or to reduce
taxes. 143 Also, a period of ineligibility may be eliminated by "undoing" the
transfer, meaning that the transferee must return the assets to the applicant so
that they can be spent on his care. 14 4 OBRA '93 also requires states to develop
standards for approving Medicaid despite the rules, in situations when denial
of Medicaid benefits would cause "undue hardship." 145 Each state will provide
its own standards as to what constitutes undue hardship. 146
OBRA '93 provides exemptions for certain transfers. The statute specifically
exempts any transfers by one spouse made for that spouse's benefit. 147 Also, a
transfer to a spouse or to someone else for the sole benefit of the spouse will
14OCollins, supra note 133, at 123.
141Soltermann, supra note 1, at 259.
142

Id.

143 Bagge, supra note 73, at 15.
144Collins, supra note 133, at 128. Collins points out another perplexing ambiguity in
the Medicaid statute:
The statute provides that all assets transferred for less than fair market
value be returned. Can a period of ineligibility be reduced rather than
eliminated by a return of a portion of the transferred assets? What
about multiple transfers? ...Will it be possible to reduce the period
of ineligibility by returning the value of one or more, but not all of the
transfers?
Id. These questions indicate a degree of risk in relying on the "undoing" provisions.
14542 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(D), 1396p(d)(5).
146 Collins, supra note 133, at 125.
14742 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B).
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not result in a period of ineligibility either.148 The new rules are thus very
protective of the spouse of a Medicaid recipient.149 The changes were necessary
to eliminate a problem, known as "spousal impoverishment," which had
previously plagued the Medicaid system. 150
Some assets are exempt from consideration when calculating a Medicaid

applicant's available resources. If these assets are sold, however, the proceeds
of the sale will be held as an available resource. One exempt asset is the home

of the applicant, the value of which is not counted towards available re-

148
Soltermanrn, supra note 1, at 260. Federal rules use the "name-on-the-instrument"
rule to determine which spouse has the income available. Id. at 261. If both spouses'
names are on the check, then each will be considered to have half of the amount available
for eligibility determination. Id. The spouse who has applied for Medicaid only needs
to spend down his or her half, rather than the entire assets of the couple, in order to
reach the Medicaid resource limit. Id.

14 9 Freedman, supra note 115, at 122 (citations omitted). Two elements of the Medicaid
statute illustrate this spousal protection. The Community Spouse Resource Allowance
[hereinafter CSRA], 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(3), and the Minimum Monthly Maintenance
Needs Allowance, 1396r-5(a)(1)(B) '"ave been the biggest secret in the whole Medicaid,
long-term care process." David G. Lupo, Medicaid-An Update on the C.S.R.A. and
M.M.M.N.A. and the Effect of OBRA '93 on Asset Preservation,50 J. Mo. B. 73, 85 (1994).
The CSRA is especially useful for spouses:
The community spouse has the right to refuse to contribute resources in excess of [the CSRA] for the institutionalized spouse's care.
This is a very important right. While this right exists in every state,
it is commonly exercised only in New York .... If the community
spouse exercises his or her refusal right, the [government] has the
right to bring an action or proceeding to require the Community
Spouse to contribute to the cost of the institutionalized spouse's
health care .... The law allows unlimited transfer of assets from
the institutionalized spouse to the community spouse without affecting Medicaid eligibiity. ... The community spouse could then
refuse to use those assets to pay for the institutionalized spouse's
care.
Freedman, supra note 115, at 124 (citations omitted).
15OCooney, supra note 4, at 528. The problem of spousal impoverishment is a function
of the low resource ceiling set by the states, combined with the very high cost of care.
The roblem arises in the following way:
One spouse (statistically, the husband) becomes ill and unable
to be cared for at home. Because the husband and wife together own
too much in assets to qualify for Medicaid, he enters a nursing home
as a private-pay patient. As his nursing home stay continues and the
couple's income-producing capital is depleted, the wife, still residing
at home in the community and incurring her own living expenses,
finds herself less and less able to keep her head above water financially. By the time their assets are down to Medicaid qualification
levels, the couple is impoverished and the community spouse is
unable to support herself, although the institutionalized spouse
now has all his expenses paid by Medicaid.
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sources. 151 A distressing situation arises when a person spends down his or her
assets to qualify for Medicaid and subsequently recovers from the illness. With
insufficient resources to pay the costs of living, the person may be forced to sell
his or her home. Then, if another illness transpires, the proceeds from the sale
of the home, no longer an exempt asset, would be countable.
B. Trusts
Medicaid eligibility and trust construction are issues which, though
technically separate, are actually intertwined. 152 There are three characteristics
of trusts that are relevant to eligibility determination. The most crucial trust
characteristic is whether the trustee has any discretion in making distributions
from the trust. Only assets in non-discretionary trusts will be exempt from
consideration when calculating Medicaid eligibility. Another crucial
characteristic is whether the trust is self-settled. If it is, the beneficiary will
eventually become eligible but will have to endure a period of ineligibility.
Additionally, the question of whether a trust is revocable or irrevocable relates
directly to whether the assets are available to the applicant.
1. Restrictions on Discretionary Trusts
Before OBRA'93, a person could place his assets in trust and obtain Medicaid
benefits, provided that distributions could not be made at the trustee's
discretion. 153 The key concept is the lack of discretion on the part of the trustee,
because then the trust assets would not be legally considered available to the
beneficiary.154 The result was that the trust assets were protected from the
spend-down requirement, thus preserving the potential of an inheritance for
the family.155 "Planned impoverishment" was simply a matter of making "a last
156
minute pit stop at an attorney's office to erect a trust shield around assets."
In cases where the trustee retains discretion, assets in self-created trusts have
been held to be available to the beneficiary, solely because of the trust's
discretionary nature. 157 One court held,
It is irrelevant that in creating the discretionary trust for [the settlor's]
benefit, the settlor did not intend to defraud her creditors or was
15142 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(1). Since the home is exempt, one can buy home improvements
or pay down a mortgage and thereby convert countable assets into non-countable assets.
Cooney, supra note 4, at 532.
152
Volkmer, supra note 129, at 189.
153Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., Self-Settled Trusts Following OBRA 1993,23 COLO. LAw. 1297,

1297(1994).
154
1d. at 1298.
155

1d.

6

15 Bagge, supra note 73, at 16.
157

Kruse, Jr., supra note 153, at 1297.
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solvent at the time of the creation of the trust. It is against public policy
to permit the settlor-beneficiary to tie up her own property in such a
way that she8 can still enjoy it but can prevent her creditors from
1
reaching it. 5
This common law doctrine was codified in the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reduction Act of 1985 [hereinafter COBRA '85].159 This statute denied
Medicaid benefits to persons who placed their assets in discretionary trusts for
their own benefit, or for the benefit of their spouse. 160
The term used in COBRA '85 to describe these trusts was "Medicaid
qualifying trust" [hereinafter MQT].161 The MQTs were described as trusts
"established by an individual or spouse under which the individual
may be
beneficiary of all or part of payments from the trust, and where [the] trustee
has discretion with regard to amounts to be distributed."162 The assets held in
the trust would be considered available for health care costs regardless of
whether they actually were, even if the trustee refused to use his discretion to
distribute them. 163 Essentially, a state will treat a discretionary trust, for
purposes of Medicaid eligibility, as if the trustee had made the maximum
distribution possible under the language of the trust instrument. 164
Although OBRA '93 repealed the MQT provisions, the eligibility rules
regarding discretionary trusts are substantially the same. The new rules still
require assets held in discretionary trusts, as well as assets in other types of
trusts, to be counted when determining whether the applicant's resources
exceed the ceiling set by the state. 165 OBRA '93 replaced the MQT provisions
with a similar, but even more restrictive, set of rules. 166 Despite these additional
restrictions, loopholes still exist. For example, a trust can be worded so as to
keep the income and principal available only until the need for long-term care

158

1d. (citing Vanderbilt Credit Corporation v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 473 N.Y.S.2d

242,246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)).

15942 U.S.C. § 1396a(k) (1988)(repealed 1993).
160

Kruse, Jr., supra note 153, at 1298.

16 1

Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)
(1988) repealedby Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,42 U.S.C. § 13 96p (1993).
The MQT name, however, was poorly chosen, perhaps to keep a consistent level of
confusion throughout the statute. A Medicaid "qualifying" trust actually disqualifies an
applicant from eligibility.
162

Colins, supra note 133, at 128.

1631d.
16 4

Soltermann, supra note 1, at 267-68.

165

1d. at 257-58.

166Collins, supranote 133, at 129.
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arises. If properly worded, the trust then causes the assets to be unavailable for
the duration of the need for costly medical care.1 67
2. Restrictions on Self-settled Trusts

Even self-settled, non-discretionary trusts are not without restrictions for
eligibility purposes. Although a self-settled trust giving no discretion to the
trustee will not be considered as an available resource, the settlor will still be
required to wait out an ineligibility period. When the settlor places his assets
in trust, he will not be eligible for Medicaid for a period of time, just as if he
68
had transferred the assets for less than fair market value.1 OBRA '93 has not
1 69
changed this aspect of non-discretionary trusts.
OBRA '93 has, however, taken a more restrictive approach to other aspects
of non-discretionary trusts, particularly those containing assets of the Medicaid
17 0
The
applicant, whether or not the applicant actually settled the trust himself.

definition of self-settled trusts was broadened to further restrict Medicaid
eligibility. The new definition now takes into consideration the owner of the
assets that are actually used to fund the trust, instead of just the person who
creates the trust.171 If a trust containing assets of an applicant is established by

the applicant, the applicant's spouse, a court, or anyone acting upon the request
of the applicant or his spouse, then the trust is considered self-settled, and the

applicant will undergo the ineligibility period.1 72 Additionally, if a trust is
funded with assets of more than one person, that portion of the trust which

167 Bagge, supra note 73, at 16. Bagge provides an example of trust language which
would accomplish this purpose:
One day prior to the admission of a Grantor as a permanent or
chronic care resident or patient in a skilled nursing facility, nursing
home or other like institution as defined in the Medicare Catastrophic
Coverage Act of 1988, all distributions of income and principal to
said Grantor shall cease and said Grantor shall have no further legal
or beneficial interest in this trust. Payments of income only, however, shall continue solely in the discretion of the trustee to the other
Grantor who is not a permanent or chronic care resident or patient in
a skilled nursing facility.... Upon the termination of one Grantor's
interest in this trust as provided above, other than by death, all
distributions of principal to the Grantor who is not a permanent or
chronic care resident or patient in a skilled nursing facility shall cease
and the Trustee shall have no discretion to distribute principal to or
for the benefit of said Grantor.
Id.
168 Freedman, supra note 115, at 128.
169
1d.
17OSchlesinger & Scheiner, supra note 126, at 77.
171

d. at 78.

17242 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(2)(A)(i-iv).
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consists of the applicant's assets will be considered self-settled by the applicant,
again requiring a period of ineligibility.173
3. Restrictions on Revocable Trusts
For eligibility purposes, a distinction is made on the basis of whether a trust
is revocable or irrevocable. If the trust is revocable, it will be considered as a
resource available to the applicant, potentially rendering him ineligible for
Medicaid benefits. 174 No period of ineligibility results from a transfer to a
revocable trust, because the assets are still regarded as available. 175 Any
payments from the trust to third parties will be considered as assets transferred
for less than fair market value and will therefore remain subject to the sixty
month look-back period. 176
If the trust is irrevocable, then available resources will consist of whatever
portion of the trust could be paid to the applicant under any circumstance (such
as at the discretion of the trustee.)177 Furthermore, any part of the trust assets
or income which cannot be paid to the individual will be considered as assets
disposed of by the individual, subject to the sixty month look-back period. 178
4. Exempt Trusts
OBRA '93 specifies three types of trusts which are exempt from being
counted as available resources for Medicaid eligibility purposes. 179 The three
types of trusts are expressly approved under the new statute and do not affect
the beneficiary's eligibility for Medicaid assistance. 180 The first exemption to
the restrictions on self-settled trusts occurs when the beneficiary is disabled
and the trust is managed by a non-profit association. The association must
"pool" trust funds from multiple individuals and then use the pool for the
benefit of all. 181 In that case, the trust funds will not be counted as resources
available to the applicant, provided that either the funds will remain in the pool
at the beneficiary's death, or the trust funds will be used to reimburse the state
for Medicaid benefits paid to that applicant. 182

17342 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(2)(B). See also Schlesinger & Scheiner, supra note 126, at 77-78.
174Schlesinger & Scheiner, supra note 126, at 78.
175 Collins, supranote 133, at 130.
176Schlesinger & Scheiner, supra note 126, at 78.
17 7
178

1d.
Id.

179

See Renee R. Neeld, Medicaid Planning: 1993 OBRA Asset Transfer Restrictionsand
Estate Recovery, 37 REs GESTAE 329, 330-31 (1994).
18 0
1d. See also Kruse, Jr., supra note 153, at 1299.
181Schlesinger & Scheiner, supra note 126, at 79.
18242 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C).
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This reimbursement requirement is also applied to the second form of
exempt trust. Any trust containing only pensions or Social Security income is
exempt if the state is entitled to reimbursement when the beneficiary dies. 183
This type of trust is known as a "Miller trust."184 Miller trusts allowed the
beneficiary to become eligible for Medicaid, as long as the trustee only has
authority to distribute an amount of income that is below the eligibility limit
set by the state.185 Miller trusts are expressly permitted under OBRA '93.186
Finally, the third type of trust exempted under OBRA'93 is any trust funded
with the assets of a disabled person who is under the age of sixty-five. 187 Such
trusts are often created when an individual receives a disabling injury and a
subsequent tort settlement. The tort money is then used to fund the trust Once
with any funds remaining in the
again, however, the state must be reimbursed188
beneficiary.
disabled
the
of
death
the
at
trust
The reimbursement requirement actually runs throughout OBRA '93. The
statute mandates recovery from the recipient's estate of all benefits paid to the
extent possible. 189 Recovery may be had from either trusts or probate assets. 190
183Schlesinger & Scheiner, supra note 126, at 80.
184

"Miller trusts" are so named because they were first judicially sanctioned in Miller
v. Ibarra, 746 F. Supp 19 (D. Colo. 1990). Miller involved four mentally incompetent
nursing home patients who had been denied Medicaid benefits because they were
beneficiaries of trusts which contained assets in excess of the maximum limit set by the
state. Id. at 20. The court held that since the trusts had been judicially created, the funds
therein could not be considered available for purposes of determining Medicaid
eligibility. Id. at 27. Furthermore, since the patients had not voluntarily transferred their
assets into the trusts, the court held that there would be no period of ineligibility due to
the judicially imposed transfer. Id. at 31.
185
n Miller, the trustees had discretion to distribute an amount which, when
combined with any other income the beneficiary might receive, would still be twenty
dollars less than the monthly income eligibility standard. 746 F. Supp at 21.
186
Collins, supra note 133, at 131.
187 Neeld, supranote 179, at 331.
188 Id.

18942 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1). This was not true prior to OBRA '93, as one commentator
explains:
Under former law, recovery was optional. The new law requires a
state to recover Medicaid expenditures from the estate of an individual
who was 65 years of age or older (the text of the law says age 55, which
is probably an error) when the individual received Medicaid benefits
and from the estate of an individual who has received benefits under
a long-term care insurance policy under certain circumstances.
Neeld, supra note 179, at 331.
190Neeld describes the scope of recovery as follows:
The recoverable estate must include all real and personal property
and other assets included within the individual's estate as defined for
purposes of state probate law. The state, at its option, may recover
payments from non-probate assets. The statute says the recoverable
estate may include any other real or personal property and other
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Prior to OBRA '93, twenty-eight states had already enacted estate recovery
laws, recovering over $34 million in 1992 alone. 191
IV. SOLUTIONS

Although OBRA '93 severely tightens the restrictions on trusts, loopholes
remain. In attempting to restrain divestment planning, Congress may have
inadvertently created the potential for divestment planning at an even more
extreme level, as potential applicants attempt to fit between the cracks in the
new law. It also remains to be seen whether the new fraud control provisions
of OBRA '93 will have any effect on the billions of wasted dollars. More
revisions or reforms will be necessary before the costs to both the government
and the citizens can be controlled. There are three possibilities to consider for
potential reform. First, the government could make another attempt at a
universal, publicly-financed health care system, like the Clinton plan. Second,
Congress could enact measures to encourage private insurers to expand their
coverage. Third, laws might be passed which would force those who could
actually pay for their own care to accept the personal obligations and family
responsibilities.
A. Public Insurance
Before the government intervened in the health care system, both doctors
and patients were encouraged to opt for less expensive medical procedures by
192
the fact that private insurance coverage was far less extensive than it is today.
After Congress enacted Medicaid (and Medicare), however, health care
providers could obtain reimbursement for almost any expense.193 Therefore,
as one would expect, health care costs spiraled upward. 194 The rising costs
naturally caused insurance premiums to increase; today only three percent of
the population carry private long-term care insurance because it is simply too
expensive.195

assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest 'at the
time of death,' including property passing by joint tenancy, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement. This probably
means "before death" since a Medicaid recipient has no interest in,
for example, a life estate at the time of death.
Neeld, supranote 179, at 331-32.
191Attempts to Shield Assets from Medicaid Will Go on Despite New Law, Panel Says, 4

MEDICARE REP. (BNA) No. 42, Oct. 22, 1993, at d15.
192Soltermann, supra note 1, at 262-63.
193

1d. at 263.

194

1d.
1 1d. at 264. One way in which health insurance actually contributes to increasing
95

costs is in the form of "moral hazard":
[Oince insurance coverage for a particular service is created,
insureds tend to take advantage of that benefit, often unneceshttps://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol43/iss4/4
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One potential solution is compulsory, government-sponsored insurance.
Since only very few people (three percent) voluntarily buy long-term care
insurance, a program would benefit from, if not require, a compulsory
aspect.1% The mandatory system is condoned in the automobile insurance
industry, so there is little reason why it would not work successfully in the
health insurance industry as well. 19 7 A public system of insurance, with
mandatory participation, may actually be superior to a private system because
the elimination of both the profit margin and the marketing expenses could
make the public sector more competitive in terms of the ratio between benefits
and premiums. 198 Another reason in support of a public over a private program
is that a publicly-controlled program would be subject to political pressures,
allowing voters to respond directly to unfavorable cost increases.199 Senior
citizen lobbying groups, which tend to have strong political influence, could
likely prevent unwarrented cost increases and possibly persuade politicians to
regularly adjust benefits to account for inflation. 200
B. PrivateInsurance
The problem with public long-term care insurance is that the government
has historically demonstrated an inability to restrain the rise in costs in other
publicly financed health care programs. 20 1 An attempt to create a universal
government-financed long-term care program would face a substantial risk of
uncontrollable public expenditures. 202 Thus, private insurance may be a better
solution. Despite the fact that private long-term care insurance has developed

sarily.... [Tihe concept of moral hazard is based on the theory of
induced demand; the supply (insurance coverage) creates more
demand (use of that coverage). In the context of long-term care, it
is hypothesized that many older individuals who now cope without public financing, or who receive only minimal public financing
to assist them, would "crawl out of the woodwork" and suddenly

"need" public financial assistance if it were more widely available. There is particular worry about possible disappearance of
informal, unpaid care that presently is provided to elders by their
families and friends, in favor of reliance on newly available public
financing for the same services.
Kapp, supra,note 5, at 734.

19 6Soltermann, supranote 1, at 280. Soltermann notes that young, healthy people often
"cannot conceive that they will ever need such insurance." Id.
197Dobris, supra note 6, at 26. "Parentalism seems to be in order. Forced small
payments over a life time of work are needed to provide the requisite funding." Id.
198Kapp, supra note 5, at 743.
199
2 00

d.
Id.

201Soltermann, supra note 1, at 286.
202Id.
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at "a snail-like pace" since the 1980's when the idea first became reality, the
number of policies sold has been increasing. 208 As more and more people
become aware of the risk of losing their life savings, sales of long-term care
insurance may increase even more.2 04 Private insurance also removes the
"perverse" incentives inherent in the Medicaid program 205 which can cause
people to impoverish themselves or to fraudulently conceal assets. Use of
private long-term care insurance could be encouraged (rather than mandated)
by the federal government by allowing tax-free savings for long-term care and
by further development of health maintenance organizations. 206 This type of
encouragement could be generated by linking benefits directly to any increased
207
costs to the taxpayers, so as to reduce resentment at paying higher taxes.
C. Family Responsibility
A third potential solution is for the federal government to encourage family
responsibility for health care costs. 208 Federal Medicaid regulations already

allow states to enact legislation requiring certain relatives to assist financially
in paying for the costs of long-term care services provided to family members
who are unable to pay for the care if the family members are collecting
Medicaid benefits.2 0 9 The problem with laws of this nature is that they may
have severe disruptive effects on the relationships among family members.
Such financial obligations, in light of the high cost of health services, could
conceivably cause feelings of resentment or guilt which, if severe enough, may
lead to neglect of one's family or even physical abuse.210 On the positive side,
however, a person paying his or her family's medical bills may qualify for tax

203Kapp, supra note 5, at 747.
204
Soltermann, supra note 1, at 282.
205
1d. Soltermann describes some of the traits of "quality" long-term care insurance
policies, indicating that they should have some form of inflation protection, a
guaranteed renewabilty feature, and should provide for home care, as well as
institutionalized care. Id. at 283. The amount of benefits paid is generally between $40
to $250 per day. Id.
206Kapp, supra note 5, at 749-50.
207

1d. at 745.

208

0ne commentator raises the persuasive question of: "Why else do people save
money and other assets during their lives except to pay for the satisfaction of their and
their loved ones' needs when they grow old?" Kapp, supra note 5, at 746.
2 09
d. at 750-51 (citing Treatment of Contributionsfrom Relatives to Medicaid Applicants
or Recipients, 2 DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN.,
STATE MEDICAID MANUAL,

§ 3812 (1983)). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D) (requiring

parents to provide the cost of medical care to minor children.)
21OKapp, supra note 5, at 751.
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deductions.2 11 Nevertheless, many feel that this type of solution would be so
212
unpopular as to make it politically impossible.
V. CONCLUSION

The current consensus among commentators is that any potentially effective
solution to the dual problem of governmental cost overruns and financial
devastation of the elderly, must involve both the public and private sectors
213 'We are going to have these
acting cooperatively rather than competitively.
2 14
them."
spread
costs. It's just a matter of we
Congress needs to tighten Medicaid eligibility requirements even further
than it has with OBRA'93. Only by reducing the number of people eligible for
Medicaid can the cost overruns be halted. Unfortunately, reducing the number
of Medicaid recipients would only solve part of the problem. With tighter
restrictions, many middle class Americans would be left with no source of
affordable long-term health care. Even though Medicaid was not intended to
cover the middle class, it has been doing so for years. If coverage for the middle
class is eliminated, a new source of coverage must be provided.
A better solution for both the government and the people of this country
would be to replace the entire Medicaid system with another system for the
middle class. One idea that has not yet been attempted is to reverse the
traditional lines of thinking. Perhaps a publicly-funded system of health care
should be constructed specifically for the middle class, while private insurers
are offered incentives to cover the poor. A program of this nature would
eliminate the incentive for middle-class divestment planning, since the middle
class would already be covered. This solution would also allow relaxation of
the restrictive and confusing rules regarding transfers and trusts. An elderly
person would no longer have to worry as much about being able to leave an
inheritance to his or her family.
To help the government control its costs, the program could be established
with the requirement of co-payment from the health care recipient or the family.
Although this family responsibility would create some of the problems
outlined above, the extent of the problems would be slight because the family's
responsibility would be partial, rather than total. Finally, co-payors and private
insurers will be on guard against fraudulent billings which will thus have the
effect of reducing costs even further.
KENNETH HUBBARD

2

11I.R.C. of 1986, § 213 (1986). This section allows deductions to the extent that medical
expenses exceed 7.5% of Adjusted Gross Income.
212Dobris, supra note 6, at 7.
2 3

1 Se, e.g., Kapp, supra note 5, at 741.

214

Id. at 754.
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